William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 10 (2018-2019)
Issue 2

Article 3

February 2019

Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of a Smart Contract Blockchain
Framework for Credit Default Swaps
Ryan Clements

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons

Repository Citation
Ryan Clements, Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of a Smart Contract Blockchain Framework
for Credit Default Swaps, 10 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 369 (2019),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol10/iss2/3
Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr

EVALUATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A
SMART CONTRACT BLOCKCHAIN FRAMEWORK
FOR CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
RYAN CLEMENTS
ABSTRACT
Despite wide speculation about its use-value, there are very
few large-scale Blockchain implementations, particularly in sophisticated financial applications and mature markets. The extent of
Blockchain’s disruptive potential in these domains is uncertain. This
Article considers Blockchain’s use-value for credit default swap contract execution, fulfillment, and post-trade processing by using, as
an assessment base, a series of derivative industry whitepapers, academic and technological evaluative studies, and commentary relating to current market undertakings. In summary, when applied to
credit default swaps, there are many barriers to implementation,
as well as costs, fragmentation risks, technological deficiencies, and
practical drawbacks. As a result, there is some doubt on the extent
of Blockchain’s short-term transformational value for complex financial structures and mature trading markets. This, at least in part,
explains the fact that Blockchain projects are currently slow to materialize in derivatives and other financial market applications.

Ryan Clements, BA (Honors, Alberta), LLB (First Class, Alberta), LLM
(Magna Cum Laude, Duke) is an adjunct law professor at the University of Alberta
and a current doctoral (SJD) candidate at Duke University School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin (“BTC”) took the world by storm in 2017.1 First, there
was an unprecedented price surge;2 then, shortly thereafter, the
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) validated
BTC derivatives3—sparking another price spike (and a round of
criticism for facilitating systemic risk).4 Although spot market selloffs in early 2018 led some to suggest the BTC bubble was “bursting”5 (and confirmed the skepticism of others, including industry
leaders,6 who questioned BTC’s viability as a payment substitute)7
Frances Coppola, Bitcoin’s Bubble Is Bursting. How Long Will Prices Fall?,
FORBES (Mar. 20, 2018, 2:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola
/2018/03/20/bitcoins-bubble-is-bursting-how-low-will-prices-fall/#20a0c2ac724e
[http://perma.cc/A5AD-88LS].
2 See Julie Verhage, Bitcoin’s Epic Rise Leaves Late-1990s Tech Bubble in
the Dust, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 2017, 10:06 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2017-08-29/bitcoin-s-epic-rise-leaves-late-1990s-tech-bubble-in-the
-dust [https://perma.cc/XY9S-XB3M].
3 LedgerX, LLC was first granted registration as a derivatives clearing organization for “fully-collateralized digital currency” swaps and options. See Press
Release No. 7592-17, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., CFTC Grants
DCO Registration to LedgerX LLC (July 24, 2017), http://www.cftc.gov/Press
Room/PressReleases/pr7592-17 [https://perma.cc/98LS-XYSY]. Then the CFTC
allowed the self-certifications of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc. and
the CBOE Futures Exchange for BTC futures products as well as the Cantor
Exchange for BTC “binary options.” See Press Release No. 7654-17, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., CFTC Statement on Self-certification of Bitcoin
Products by CME, CFE, and Cantor Exchange (Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.cftc
.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7654-17 [https://perma.cc/94AZ-7P5U].
4 In response to this criticism, the CFTC scheduled a series of meetings to
investigate the self-certification process and the risks inherent in the digital
currency derivatives market. See Pete Schroeder & Michelle Price, U.S. Derivatives Regulator to Review Bitcoin Futures Risks, REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2018,
12:22 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cftc-bitcoin/u-s-derivatives
-regulator-to-review-bitcoin-futures-risks-idUSKBN1ET20R [https://perma.cc
/P66M-786H].
5 See Coppola, supra note 1.
6 See Matthew Frankel, What 3 Billionaires Think About Bitcoin, MOTLEY
FOOL (June 15, 2017), https://www.fool.com/retirement/2017/06/15/what-3-bil
lionaires-think-about-bitcoin.aspx [https://perma.cc/2MMK-HMPN].
7 See David Henry & Anna Irrera, JP Morgan’s Dimon Says Bitcoin “is a
fraud,” REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2017, 9:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us
-usa-banks-conference-jpmorgan/jpmorgans-dimon-says-bitcoin-is-a-fraud-idU
SKCN1BN2KP [https://perma.cc/JB9L-UYHT].
1
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many BTC skeptics also proclaimed Blockchain8—BTC’s underlying
technology9—as the real future.10
This sentiment seems almost ubiquitous at times.11 Despite
the absence of large-scale, Blockchain implementations and what
technology writer, Irving Wladawsky-Berger, asserts in a recent
Wall Street Journal article called a Blockchain “killer-app,”12 no one
knows the extent that Blockchain will ultimately impact commercial transactions and financial markets.13 There is a lot of speculation about its use value across multiple applications including data
management,14 servicing assets,15 identity protection,16 and supply
chain.17 There is even talk about Blockchain being valuable for
For simplicity, in this Article I refer to “Blockchain” as representative of
the term “distributed ledger technology.” There are, strictly speaking, other
forms of distributed ledger technology in addition to Blockchain.
9 See Sean Williams, The Basics of Blockchain Technology, Explained in
Plain English, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 10, 2018, 8:09 AM), https://www.fool.com
/investing/2018/01/10/the-basics-of-blockchain-technology-explained-in-p.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9VV9-ZWRW].
10 See Polina Marinova, Jamie Dimon: Bitcoin Bad, Blockchain Good,
FORTUNE (Sept. 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/13/jamie-dimon-bitcoin
-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/DW6P-3TYG].
11 See Michael J. Casey & Paul Vigna, In Blockchain We Trust, MIT TECH.
REV. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610781/in-blockchain
-we-trust/ [https://perma.cc/D6Z4-KF6Q].
12 See Irving Wladawsky-Berger, In Search of Blockchain’s Killer-Apps,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2018/03/09/is
-search-of-blockchains-killer-apps/ [https://perma.cc/8VHL-MZHQ].
13 Id.
14 See EMBRACING DISRUPTION: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS TO IMPROVE THE POST-TRADE LANDSCAPE 13 (Jan. 2016) [hereinafter
DTCC WHITEPAPER] (“DTCC’s viewpoint is that basic industry master data is
an ideal candidate for improvement using decentralized consensus, rule standardization and auditable change history. This information is used by the entire
industry by definition, and the lack of consistency and quality is a recurrent
industry problem. Further, this could be constructed in such a manner that multiple firms can be authorized as data submitters, there can be many data
validators and the majority of users will be data consumers.”).
15 Id. at 13–14.
16 The amount of cybersecurity data protection that a Blockchain provides
varies with each Blockchain. See generally Adam Waks, Blockchain and Privacy, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.as
px?g=82c7ceb8-621f-4f6f-881f-8eabcf4507a6 [https://perma.cc/LV9M-4EB3].
17 See Jacob Bunge, Latest Use for a Bitcoin Technology: Tracing Turkeys
From Farm To Table, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/latest-use-for-a-bitcoin-technology-tracing-turkeys-from-farm-to
-table-1508923801 [https://perma.cc/26LW-G34N]; see also Robert Hackett,
8
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election fraud prevention18 and having important residual benefits
for charities.19 The question of Blockchain’s application to complex financial transactions in mature economic markets is yet to
be proven,20 and it is in this forum where the Article seeks to contribute. Specifically, the Article will consider Blockchain’s use value
in over-the-counter (“OTC”) and centrally cleared credit default
swaps (“CDS”)—the risk management tools popularly vilified for
their part in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”).21
The reason OTC CDSs have been chosen for this assessment
is because they have been described by some, including technology
writer, Noelle Acheson, as “ideal” for Blockchain implementation
since they have a “programmable structure,” they operate in a postGFC regulatory “standardized” setting, and they trade largely “in
a self-contained market.”22 What can be concluded, however, upon
reviewing the mechanics of CDS contractual functionality, and the
pros and cons of using Blockchain for CDS post-trade processing, is
Walmart and 9 Food Giants Team Up on IBM Blockchain Plans, FORTUNE
(Aug. 22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22/walmart-blockchain-ibm-food-nestle
-unilever-tyson-dole/ [https://perma.cc/X5S6-KHB2].
18 See Alyssa Satara, What Is Blockchain Used for Besides Bitcoin?, FORBES
(Nov. 17, 2017, 12:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2017/11/17/what-is
-blockchain-used-for-besides-bitcoin/#3b4cdc7d446e [https://perma.cc/D44R-22F6].
19 See Rhodri Davies, Knowing Me, Knowing You: Self-Sovereign Digital
Identity and The Future For Charities, CAF CHARITIES & FOUND. (July 21, 2017),
https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/blog-home/giving-thought/the-future-of-doing
-good/self-sovereign-digital-identity-and-the-future-of-charity [https://perma.cc
/T4AR-VEZL].
20 See Amy Nordrum, Wall Street Firms to Move Trillions to Blockchains
in 2018, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 29, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org
/telecom/internet/wall-street-firms-to-move-trillions-to-blockchains-in-2018
[https://perma.cc/S22H-ZJ5B].
21 The role that CDS played in the 2008 financial crisis has been widely
cited, particularly in regards to American International Group, Inc.’s (“AIG”)
CDS overexposure and subsequent government bailout. See Gina-Gail S.
Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging with
Credit Derivatives, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 853–54 (2014); see also
Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation’s Missing Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29, 30, 44–45, 60 (2011);
William Spencer Topham, Re-regulating “Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction”
Observations on Repealing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act and
Future Derivative Regulation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 133, 135 (2010).
22 Noelle Acheson, Blockchain and credit default swaps—Part 2, the application, FINTECHBLUE (Sept. 13, 2017), http://www.fintechblue.com/2017/09
/blockchain-credit-default-swaps-part-2-application/ [https://perma.cc/68TJ-TR27].
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that at least in the short run, the costs largely outweigh the benefits.23 Blockchain could be the future of financial transactions, but
at the moment, when applied to CDS there are many barriers to
integration.24 Perhaps, this should give us pause with respect to
the technology itself 25 and the deficiencies it may introduce when
rendering contracts to code.26 At the very least it should temper
some of the “irrational exuberance”27 about Blockchain and just
how disruptive it will ultimately be for complex financial transactions and mature market structures.28
In arriving at this conclusion, the Article relies on and
applies the findings of numerous industry technological assessment papers, academic studies, and market commentaries with
a particular focus on a series of recent whitepapers29 published
by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)30
See generally DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14.
See Acheson, supra note 22.
25 See Kai Stinchcombe, Blockchain is not only crappy technology but a bad
vision for the future, MEDIUM (Apr. 5, 2018), https://medium.com/@kaistinch
combe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hell
hole-c1ca122efdec [https://perma.cc/LY9H-U2SP].
26 See Usha Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain 5–6 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of
Law Research Paper No. 2018-07, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3127782
[https://perma.cc/7DBX-E4DA].
27 The term “irrational exuberance” was first used by Alan Greenspan to
describe the dot.com boom and then later adopted by Nobel Prize winner
Robert Shiller in his book of the same name. Shiller has also labeled Bitcoin as
“irrational exuberance” and compared it to the Tulip craze of the seventeenth
century. See Brad Tuttle, Bitcoin Is Likely To ‘Totally Collapse and Be Forgotten,’
Nobel Prize-Winning Economist Says, MONEY (Jan. 19, 2018), http://time.com
/money/5109474/bitcoin-predictions-collapse-economist-robert-shiller/ [https://
perma.cc/DD8W-MDKF].
28 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 18.
29 See generally INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INFRASTRUCTURE, https://
www.isda.org/category/infrastructure/market-infrastructure-technology [https://
perma.cc/W3Q6-ALHT]; INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, THE FUTURE OF DERIVATIVES PROCESSING & MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE (Sept. 15, 2016), https://
www.isda.org/2016/09/15/the-future-of-derivatives-processing-and-market-infra
structure/ [https://perma.cc/SP8T-FWU7] [hereinafter ISDA FUTURE PROCESSING];
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N LINKLATERS, WHITE PAPER: SMART CONTRACTS
& DISTRIBUTED LEDGER—A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (Aug. 2017), https://www.isda
.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contracts-and-distributed-ledger-a-legal-perspective.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FZ5G-B862] [hereinafter ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER].
30 ISDA has been described as the “de facto trade association of the global
OTC derivatives industry.” See Dan Awrey, Limits of Private Ordering Within
Modern Financial Markets, 34 REV. FIN. & BANKING L. 184, 205 (2014); see
23
24
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and by swap data repository Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC).31 Also, several financial market participants have
considered migrating operational infrastructure to the Blockchain
and their justifications, and related commentary, will also be assessed and applied.32 In light of these resources, the Article will proceed as follows: in Part I, after providing an overview of Blockchain,
smart contracts, and transactional foundations for CDS (and introducing the ISDA Master Agreement (“MA”) structure), the Article
will present a hypothetical smart contract CDS operational framework, using ISDA recommendations from a 2017 joint whitepaper
on smart contracts with global law firm Linklaters.33 The Section
will further adapt the framework for operational technicalities
based on current academic studies and industry assessments of
Blockchain.34 This Section will also discuss recommendations from
both ISDA35 and the DTCC36 on how Blockchain could use hybrid
models (combining current infrastructure with Blockchain)37 and
will conclude by highlighting the concerns that stand in the way
of full integration.38 Part II will consider the costs and benefits
of using “permissioned” 39 Blockchain infrastructure for CDS
operations, post-trade processing, and Dodd Frank Act (DFA)
also Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational Private
Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future of
Financial Reform, 54 VA. J. INT’L. L. 9, 13 (2013). ISDA was founded in 1985
and now operates in sixty-eight countries with over 875 members. See INT’L
SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, About ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda
[https://perma.cc/7GS6-DPWX] (ISDA created “the ISDA Master Agreement and
a wide range of related documentation materials, and in ensuring the enforceability of their netting and collateral provisions, has helped to significantly reduce
credit and legal risk.”).
31 See generally DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14.
32 See Amy Nordrum, Wall Street Firms to Move Trillions to Blockchains in
2018, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 29, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tele
com/internet/wall-street-firms-to-move-trillions-to-blockchains-in-2018 [https://
perma.cc/S22H-ZJ5B].
33 See generally ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29. References to this
whitepaper, throughout the body of the Article, will for simplicity, combine ISDA
and Linklaters collectively by the descriptive term “ISDA.”
34 See generally id.
35 See id. at 13–15.
36 See generally DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 13.
37 See generally id.; ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29.
38 See generally DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14; ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER,
supra note 29.
39 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 6–7.

376 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:369
Title VII40 regulatory compliance, and will show that despite potential cost savings and operational efficiencies, there are technological and practical barriers to widespread adoption, and the
investment returns for near term implementation are uncertain.41
The Article concludes by surveying recent derivatives (primarily
focused on post-trade processing) and financial services market
Blockchain implementations.42
I. WHAT DOES A SMART CONTRACT-CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK LOOK LIKE?
A. Blockchain Foundations: The Basics
Blockchain facilitates a “distributed, decentralized, immutable ledger for verifying and recording transactions” and a means
to “securely send, receive, and record value or information through a
peer-to-peer network of computers.”43 Because it is decentralized,
and transactions are “cryptographically signed”44 it purports to protect against cyber-attacks by “creating a public, cryptographically
protected transaction list.”45 ISDA has also noted that Blockchain
can be public (like Bitcoin) or “permissioned” (private) with the
latter allowing for an “override” or “super-administrator” function.46
Blockchain works to remove the role of “trust” in our financial
transactions.47 As Edward Baker in a recent Southwestern Law
Review article describes, we trust banks to hold our money, governments to secure it, credit card companies and payment systems to “verify and authenticate transactions,” and the legal system
Title VII to the Dodd Frank Act instituted comprehensive regulation for
OTC derivatives. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2010).
41 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 18.
42 See generally id.
43 Nicolette Kost De Sevres, Bart Chilton & Bradley Cohen, The Blockchain
Revolution, Smart Contracts and Financial Transactions, 21 No. 5 CYBERSPACE
LAWYER NL 3, 1 (2016).
44 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 7.
45 Edward D. Baker, Trustless Property Systems and Anarchy: How Trustless Property Technology Will Shape the Future of Property Exchange, 45 SW.
L. REV. 351, 355 (2015).
46 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 8; see also Nordrum, supra
note 32.
47 See Baker, supra note 45, at 352.
40
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to protect our interests.48 Cryptography can add trust;49 however,
criminals can also use cryptography against us.50 Since consumer
distrust in financial institutions has increased post GFC, Blockchain could also remove power and control away from the banks.51
The “chain” in a Blockchain is simply a “chain of ownership of a given piece of property,”52 each transaction being proved
by cryptography53 in a process called “mining”54 (miners receive
a small amount of some “virtual currency” for performing the
cryptographic calculations).55 Once proven, the “time-stamped”
transaction block is published on the distributed ledger.56 Each
“node” (user) on the network gets a copy of the new information
at the same time so there are not duplicative records.57 Thus,
Blockchain eliminates the need for “centralized storage” and
reduces “single point of failure” risks (like hacking or technological failure).58 For all of its benefits however, Blockchain poses
several regulatory challenges including costs of enforcement and
anonymity.59
Id. at 353.
See David J. Phillips, Cryptography Secrets and the Structure of Trust, in
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 24 (Philip Agre & Marc
Rotenberg eds., 2001).
50 See Baker, supra note 45, at 354.
51 See id. at 357; see also Adrian Blundell-Wignall, The Bitcoin Question:
Currency Versus Trustless Transfer Technology 7 (OECD Working Papers on
Finance, Insurance, and Private Pensions, Working Paper No. 37, 2014).
52 See Baker, supra note 45, at 357.
53 See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/RES6-GLQ6].
54 See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, The Private Digital Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111,
172 (2012).
55 See Nakamoto, supra note 53, at 119.
56 Paul Farmer, Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire & the Need
for Legal Innovation, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 85, 88–89 (2014).
57 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 7; see also Ryan Surujnath,
Off the Chain! A Guide to Blockchain Derivatives Markets and the Implications
on Systemic Risk, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 26970 (2017).
58 Surujnath, supra note 57, at 261.
59 See generally Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin
Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling,
16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 218, 221 (2014).
48
49
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B. Distinguishing Blockchain From Smart Contracts
A widely cited use of Blockchain is to create “smart contracts”a blockchain-hosted60 and executed61 agreement that relies
on computer code to be “self-executing” (as opposed to relying on
third parties, like lawyers or courts for condition settlement, execution, and remedies).62 The process of “uploading” a smart contract to
the Blockchain varies depending on the Blockchain, but one of the
most popular cryptocurrency applications, Ethereum (ETH),63 was
designed to facilitate smart contracts.64 ETH differs from BTC in
that instead of tracking “ownership of digital currency” it simply
provides a means of “running the programming code of any decentralized application.”65 Like BTC, ETH has a cryptocurrency
(Ether), but the purpose of Ether is not to replace money but rather
to monetize developers to “build and run distributed applications.”66
60 The benefit of hosting a smart contract on a Blockchain is the creation of
a “golden” record and the ability for contractual automation. See ISDA 2017
WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 9:
DLT allows the code to be embedded in the distributed ledger.
This means there is only one ‘golden’ version, which effectively
binds both parties. More importantly, once the code is switched
on, the parties can take comfort from the fact that it will selfexecute automatically and neither party can tamper with that.
This is what is meant when smart contracts are described as
‘self-enforcing.’ There should be no need to resort to the courts
to enforce the legal contract for payment because, when the
relevant event occurs, failure to pay is not something that can
happen within the code.
61 See id. at 8.
62 See Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 263, 266–67, 275 (2017) (“Smart contracts enable firms to transact
without the need for law or courts. They can autonomously negotiate with other
parties (or other parties’ smart contracts), and then attach directly to the parties’
information systems so that goods or payment promised by the contract are automatically delivered.”); see also Jacob Rund, ISDA to Increase Focus on ‘Smart’ Contracts, Trade Automation, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ROLL CALL (Mar. 8, 2017).
63 “Ethereum is an open software platform based on blockchain technology
that enables developers to build and deploy decentralized applications.” See Ameer
Rosic, What is Ethereum? A Step by Step Beginners Guide, BLOCKGEEKS (Mar. 12,
2017), https://blockgeeks.com/guides/ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/Z3WV-B87E].
64 See Surujnath, supra note 57, at 273; see also ETHEREUM, https://www
.ethereum.org [http://perma.cc/4JYY-Q5AF].
65 Rosic, supra note 63.
66 Prableen Bajpai, Bitcoin vs. Ethereum: Driven by Different Purposes, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 12, 2018, 3:08 PM), https://www.investopedia.com/articles
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C. Smart Contract Foundations and Operational Mechanics
In its most basic definition, ISDA defines a smart contract
as “the automation and self-execution (and thereby enforcement)
of a pre-set conditional action.”67 As such, a smart contract “operate[s] without the need for human legal interpretation”68 and
can be “nested” with other smart contracts to scale complexity.69
Computer scientist Nick Szabo70 first coined the term “smart contract” in the mid-1990s and described it as a contract “embedded
in the hardware and software we deal with, in such a way as to
make breach of contract expensive.”71 Szabo suggested that smart
contracts would solve the “computational and transaction costs”
of agreement design, execution, and default remedy through the
use of “protocols, users interfaces, and promises expressed via those
interfaces.”72 By way of interesting context, Szabo also created
“bit gold”73 (a predecessor to BTC), attended law school “for fun,”74
/investing/031416/bitcoin-vs-ethereum-driven-different-purposes.asp [http://perma
.cc/2UMN-EPRS].
67 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 5.
68 Gabrielle Orum Hernandez, With Contract Automation, Ambition Doesn’t
Always Align with Reality, LEGALTECH NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017, 9:46 AM), https://
www.law.com/legaltechnews/almID/1202782521057/ [http://perma.cc/B5FG-B8J4].
69 Sklaroff, supra note 62, at 273.
70 See Richtopia, The 100 Most Influential Blockchain People (May 9, 2018,
6:33 PM), https://www.rise.global/top-fintech-people/p/5824542/r/2520358 [http://
perma.cc/3UHR-Q4VJ]; see also Antonio Madeira, 30 Most Influential People
In The Blockchain Space, CRYPTOCOMPARE (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.cryp
tocompare.com/coins/guides/30-most-influential-people-in-the-blockchain-space/
[http://perma.cc/24PT-L8KG].
71 Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, EXTROPY
#16 (1996), http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CD
ROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2
.html [http://perma.cc/F9Q7-LDQH].
72 Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Formalization and Securing Relationship
on Public Networks, FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 1997), http://firstmonday.org/ojs
/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469%23Building [http://perma.cc/PFG7-FU7G].
73 See generally Nick Szabo, Bit Gold, UNENUMERATED (Dec. 27, 2008, 4:16
PM), http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/2005/12/bit-gold.html [http://perma
.cc/7GFL-QQQ8].
74 Shane Ferro, The alleged Bitcoin founder went to law school for fun 
and that says a lot about what Bitcoin is really for, BUS. INSIDER (May 15, 2015,
3:01 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-is-about-property-law-2015-5
[http://perma.cc/9W6K-QX7A].
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and is alleged by some to be the mysterious BTC creator Satoshi
Nakamoto75 (a claim Szabo has denied).76
Like BTC, smart contracts are “immutable” (in that they
cannot be breached) because of what Jeremy Sklaroff describes as
“decentralized consensus, instantaneous exchange, and complex
computational states.”77 In other words, there is an automatic
consequence and remedy if a party defaults (so enforcement is
eliminated).78 In a well-cited example by Szabo, a lessee defaulting
on a car payment would trigger automatic responses (like the termination of digitized keys, or the transfer of funds from a collateral account).79 ISDA points out that smart contracts should be
See Nathaniel Popper, Decoding the Enigma of Satoshi Nakamoto and the
Birth of Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015
/05/17/business/decoding-the-enigma-of-satoshi-nakamoto-and-the-birth-of-bit
coin.html?mcubz=0 [http://perma.cc/FY7R-9FEF].
76 See Rob Price, The man everyone thinks is the creator of bitcoin gave a
speech discussing the history of the technology, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 13, 2015, 7:49
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/nick-szabo-ethereum-bitcoin-blockchain
-history-satoshi-nakamoto-2015-11?r=UK&IR=T [http://perma.cc/PUS4-TPT9].
77 Sklaroff, supra note 62, at 273:
It is written and executed without the need for expensive intermediating institutions; by interacting with devices that monitor
states of the world and with firms’ internal information systems, it can check whether conditions are satisfied and then
instantaneously provide the bargained-for goods or money. And
it can exist either in isolation or be nested within multiple sets of
other smart contracts, so that its complexity can scale up to
meet whatever transaction logic the parties desire.
78 See id. at 267. See generally Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts
Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 33132 (2017).
79 See Szabo, supra note 72:
As another example, consider a hypothetical digital security
system for automobiles. The smart contract design strategy
suggests that we successively refine security protocols to more
fully embed in a property the contractual terms which deal with
it. These protocols would give control of the cryptographic keys
for operating the property to the person who rightfully owns
that property, based on the terms of the contract. In the most
straightforward implementation, the car can be rendered inoperable unless the proper challenge-response protocol is completed
with its rightful owner, preventing theft. But if the car is being used to secure credit, strong security implemented in this
traditional way would create a headache for the creditor—the
repo man would no longer be able to confiscate a deadbeat’s car.
75
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distinguished from coded software “automated” contracts (which
are not new), as true smart contracts use a singular code “embedded in the distributed ledger.”80 ISDA also notes that “smart
contract code” (computer code automating certain tasks) is different from “smart legal contracts” (automated “legal” agreements
satisfying the doctrinal conditions of offer, acceptance, consideration, intention to contract, and certainty of terms).81 In ISDA’s
view, “every smart legal contract can be said to contain one or more
pieces of smart contract code, but not every piece of smart contract
code comprises a smart legal contract.”82 Also, smart contracts may
require some element of human oversight and intervention.83
The benefits of smart contracts include transactional efficiency and minimization of monitoring and enforcement costs,84 as
well as “the integrity of data.”85 However, as identified by Jeremy
Sklaroff in a recent University of Pennsylvania Law Review article,
smart contracts also introduce significant costs since they must contemplate “all future states,” and there is uncertainty whether contemplation of all contingencies is possible.86 As such, Sklaroff notes
that smart contract formation creates an externality “by removing
To redress this problem, we can create a smart lien protocol: if
the owner fails to make payments, the smart contract invokes
the lien protocol, which returns control of the car keys to the
bank. This protocol might be much cheaper and more effective
than a repo man. A further reification would probably remove
the lien when the loan has been paid.
80 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 9.
81 See id. at 6 (“For a smart legal contract, there would need to be a legal
contract satisfying the requirements of the relevant governing law, but with some
element of that legal contract being electronically automated. With smart contract code, in contrast, there might exist no legal contract at all.”).
82 Id. at 5.
83 Id.
84 See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 78, at 31718. See generally Harry
Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 68990 (2012).
85 See Sklaroff, supra note 62, at 275.
86 See id. at 277:
The transactional relationship created by a smart contract between two firms must be completely formed and precisely defined,
eliminating forms of flexibility that are crucial to the contracting
process. In this sense, the transaction costs of entering into smart
contracts may actually be higher than those associated with
traditional semantic contracts.
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enforcement flexibility.”87 As a result, Professors Kevin Werbach
and Nicolas Cornell argue that smart contracts have a “fundamentally different purpose” from conventional contracts88 and
given formation costs and application drawbacks, there is a measure of uncertainty as to whether they will ever fully supplant
traditional forms.89
Id.:
Parties that cannot build bespoke contracts prefer to avoid litigation and resolve contract disputes informally. Litigation over
generic contracts is unpredictable and extremely costly, incentivizing parties to bootstrap their relationshiptheir history of business and the promise of more business in the futureas a cheap
way to constrain opportunistic behavior. Smart contracts remove these informal strategies from parties’ range of responses
to breach. Once initialized, a smart contract creates a permanent and unalterable link between the terms of the contract
and the information systems it manipulates, lasting until the
transaction is complete. Without the ability to flexibly enforce
their agreement, parties who determined that custom legal
agreements were too expensive will instead be forced to rely
on customized and equally expensive blocks of code.
See also id. at 27778.
88 See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 78, at 318:
While smart contracts can meet the doctrinal requirements of
contract law, they serve a fundamentally different purpose.
Contract law is a remedial institution. Its aim is not to ensure
performance ex ante, but to adjudicate the grievances that may
arise ex post. Smart contracts bring this core function of contract law into sharper relief, as they eliminate the act of remediation by admitting no possibility of breach. But, the needs
that gave rise to contract law do not disappear. If the parties
do not or cannot represent all possible outcomes of the smart
contract arrangement ex ante, the results may diverge from
their mutual intent. The parties’ expression may also not produce legally sanctioned outcomes, as in the case of duress, unconscionability, or illegality. Promise-oriented disputes and
grievances will not disappear, but their complexions will shift.
In such scenarios, either the parties or the state will seek to
reintroduce the machinery of contractual adjudication. Once
one properly appreciates what isand what is notthe function of contract law, it becomes evident that the reports of its
death are “greatly exaggerated.”
89 Sklaroff, supra note 62, at 30002.
87
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D. Introducing Credit Default Swaps
CDSs were invented in 1991 by Bankers Trust and later refined by the investment banking arm of J.P. Morgan in the mid1990s.90 A CDS is fundamentally a hedge91 against credit risk,92
where a purchaser buys protection against a “credit event” on an
underlying asset.93 If the credit event occurs during a prescribed
time frame the protection seller indemnifies the purchaser (and
if the event doesn’t occur then the seller keeps the premium).94
In practice, CDSs are often much more complicated.95 Pre-GFC,
90 See JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES: HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS,
CAPTIVE REGULATORS, AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME MORTGAGES A THRILLING
BUSINESS 192 (1st ed. 2014).
91 The use of CDSs to hedge risk has been criticized, however, see Fletcher,
supra note 21, at 897:
The use of credit derivatives to neutralize risk exposure is, itself, fraught with risks. Firms that choose to offset risks with
these complex instruments may be exposed to different risks,
including counterparty risk, convergence risk, basis risk, or
codependent risk. To decide whether a transaction is a true
hedge, therefore, the inquiry should not focus on the intent of
the parties or on the source of the risk; rather, a true hedge
should be determined by looking at whether the benefits of the
transaction outweigh the costs. While balancing the costs against
the expected benefits of the transaction seems straightforward,
firms and the markets are limited in their ability to accurately
gauge the costs of using credit derivatives to hedge. Asymmetrical information and negative externalities affect the ability of
firms to account for the costs of hedging with credit derivatives.
Regulation is needed to force parties to account for costs that
they would otherwise fail to incorporate when deciding how to
value the costs of credit derivatives used to manage risk exposure.
See also Patrick A. Jackman & John R. Wilson, Using Derivatives to Have Your
Cake and Eat It, Too, 24 COLO. L. 2213 (1995). See generally Bernard J. Karol,
An Overview of Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
195, 197 (1995).
92 Jongho Kim, Can Risks be Reduced in the Derivatives Market? Lessons from
the Deal Structure Analysis of Modern Financial Engineering Debacles, 6 DEPAUL
BUS. & COM. L.J. 29, 31 (2008). See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, More than
Just “New Financial Bingo”: A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 34 (1997).
93 See generally Fletcher, supra note 21, at 828.
94 Id. at 82829.
95 Consider for example during the GFS, CDS were sold by AIG on opaque
structures like mortgage backed securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). See TAUB, supra note 90, at 19293:
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CDSs traded “over the counter”96 and operated without central
clearing97 (post-GFC reforms introduced mandatory clearing for
many standardized CDSs and also exchanged trading through organized swap execution facilities).98 In 2016, the Intercontinental
Exchange (“ICE”) debuted a trading platform99 for clearing “singlename credit default swaps,”100 signaling a departure from bank
oversight of CDS trading and allowing for wider market participation.101 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
Early on, the loans and bonds on which AIG sold credit protection were fairly transparent. But when they began to sell
CDSs for residential MBSs and CDOs based on them, the clarity
vanished. The names and credit histories of the underlying homeowners were not shared with investors in these mortgagelinked securities.
Also, the opacity of CDS was increased through the use of “synthetic”
structures. See Synthetic CDO, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com
/terms/s/syntheticcdo.asp [http://perma.cc/53SK-4WR2].
96 Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives (Continued), 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 747, 747 (1997). See generally Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How
Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and
Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53 (1995); William F.
Stutts, The Derivative as Fiend: Killer Bunny or Trojan Rabbit?, 36 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 827 (2001).
97 Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter
Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 130305 (2010); see also Jared M.
Burden, Blowing Bubbles: Participations, Derivatives, and How Sharing Risk
Creates Banking Crisis, 45 TULSA L. REV. 551, 572 (2010). The non-cleared
OTC derivatives market has been widely cited as a significant contributor to the
GFC. See Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit
Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 34 (2011).
98 See generally Donal Gallagher et al., Daisy Chains and Non-Cleared OTC
Derivatives, QUATERNION RISK MGMT. (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.quaternion
.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Optimisation_White_Paper_0_1.pdf [http://
perma.cc/39ST-ZACB].
99 See Credit Default Swaps: Growth in Clearing and Futures, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE INC., https://www.theice.com/article/cds-growth [http://perma
.cc/XSZ3-79RF].
100 See Christopher L. Culp, Andria van der Merwe & Bettina J. Stärkle,
Single-Name Credit Default Swaps: A Review of Empirical Academic Literature,
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVE ASS’N, at v (Sept. 2016), https://www.isda.org/a
/KSiDE/single-name-cds-literature-review-culp-van-der-merwe-staerkle-isda.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2AWG-U3F5]; see also Vincent Basulto & Richard J. Lee,
Single-Name Credit Default Swaps: A Primer, LEXOLOGY (May 2, 2016), https://
www.rkollp.com/assets/htmldocuments/Single-Name%20Credit%20Default%20
Swaps%20A%20Primer.pdf [http://perma.cc/VQX3-RZS2].
101 See Sridhar Natarajan & Matthew Leising, ICE Said to Let Investors
Bypass Banks in Credit-Swap Trades, BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2016, 10:36 AM),
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regulatory jurisdiction over “security-based swaps”102 (which includes most “single name credit default swaps”)103 and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has jurisdiction over
“swaps” (including CDS index classes104which are standardized,
centrally cleared, traded (through a swap execution facility), and
benefit from higher liquidity).105
The primary contracting vehicle for non-cleared OTC CDSs
is the ISDA Master Agreement (“MA”).106 The MA contains standardized terms for efficiency but can also be uniquely customized107
(which customization takes place in the schedules to the MA, the
credit support annex, the confirmations, and the product specific
definitions—all of which together form, along with the MA, a “single
contract,” which format allows for multiple trades, established in
confirmations under one MA).108 The MA also provides for continuing regulatory compliance through a “multilateral contractual
amendment mechanism” called a “Protocol.”109 Post-GFC legislative
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-19/ice-said-to-let-investors
-bypass-banks-in-credit-swaps-trading.
102 See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM., FACT SHEET, DEFINING SWAPSRELATED TERMS, https://www.sec.gov/opa/Article/press-release-2012-67---related
-materials.html [http://perma.cc/6ZQZ-XLC8].
103 Id. A “single name credit default swap” is only one type of credit default
swap. Credit default swaps also encompass a range of other credit derivative
products including credit default index swaps and credit default swaps on a
“basket of entities.” See EDUPRISTINE, Credit Derivatives Explained in Detail
(Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.edupristine.com/blog/credit-derivatives-in-detail [http://
perma.cc/QSX6-RZ86].
104 See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM., CFTC ISSUES CLEARING
DETERMINATION FOR CERTAIN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND INTEREST RATE SWAPS
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6429-12 [http://
perma.cc/TT62-6SN4].
105 See generally Acheson, supra note 22.
106 It has been estimated that ISDA Master Agreements are used in over 90
percent of OTC CDSs. See Ian Acker, Strength in Transparency: Mitigating
Systemic Risk Through Harmonization of Reporting Requirements for OTC
Derivatives, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 947, 970 (2017).
107 See id. at 953, 970–71.
108 See LEXIS BANKING & FINANCE PSL, Scope of the ISDA Master Agreement
and Schedule—Overview, https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/bankingand
finance/document/391289/57X4-8841-F185-X2H3-00000-00/ [https://perma.cc
/7BQ9-GRMY].
109 Protocol Overview, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www2
.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/about-isda-protocols, [https://
perma.cc/5WGY-CHFR] (“The fundamental benefit to an adhering party to a
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provisions contained in the DFA110 introduced “swap data repositories” (“SDR”) as a mechanism for containing systemic risk by
maintaining what Ian Acker calls a “centralized electronic database for OTC derivatives transactions”;111 however, because of certain SDR indemnification provisions in the DFA,112 it has been
estimated that only “sixty to eighty percent” of the U.S. OTC credit
derivatives market is reported to regulators.113
E. ISDA’s Vision for a Smart Contract Master Agreement
Framework
ISDA (together with Linklaters) has identified that, in a
CDS, the “main payments and deliveries are heavily dependent
on conditional logic.”114 As such, they have outlined a potential
CDS OTC Blockchain framework that could be used to record
transactions (the “golden record”), warehouse data, give access to
protocol is that it eliminates the necessity for costly and time-consuming bilateral negotiations.”); see also Acker, supra note 106, at 972 explaining:
Examples of protocols that promote compliance with local U.S.
and European regulatory requirements include the Dodd-Frank
Protocol, which facilitates implementation of various CFTC
rulemakings, and the EMIR Protocol, which, inter alia, does the
same for new portfolio reconciliation, dispute resolution, and
disclosure protocols. Additionally, ISDA’s Working Group on
Margin Requirements (WGMR) issued a final protocol creating a
policy framework for margin requirements for non-cleared OTC
derivatives that official regulators in individual jurisdictions
use as a model for their own markets—a prime example of ISDA
promoting its own policies successfully. Protocols issued by
ISDA are optional and only go into effect when both parties to
the Master Agreement “adhere” to it. More than just a buzzword,
adherence to ISDA protocols by members is a specific process
that must be performed via the association’s website and involves the transmittance of firm-specific information.
See also MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR,
FIN. REG.: LAW & POL’Y, 1115 (2016) (“As of December 31, 2015, ISDA has
developed two primary Dodd-Frank Act business conduct protocols, which addresses the CFTC’s rules on (1) swap trading documentation, (2) the end-user
exception to the clearing requirement, and (3) portfolio reconciliation. Each of
these protocols had close to 17,000 adhering parties.”).
110 See 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012).
111 Acker, supra note 106, at 964.
112 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 728, 763 (2012).
113 Acker, supra note 106, at 965.
114 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 19.
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regulators, host the smart contracts (or smart contract code), and
also be programmed to execute automatically when conditional commands are satisfied.115 In order to establish this framework, they
suggest that ledger participants (financial institutions) could be
given a “unique private key” which would also act as an “electronic
signature” and when integrated with smart contract code could
validate signing authority.116 They also note that the MA could be
written in formal language “tractable by computers” or written in
“natural language” with references to code stored elsewhere.117 As
suggested by technology consultant Breana Patel, the smart contract CDS could also be written to adhere with “collateral, swap and
margin” regulatory requirements, and also execute automatically
through conditional logic programmed in the Blockchain code.118
A CDS must have a “credit event” determination.119 This
would need to be contemplated in the smart contract and ISDA,
pursuant to its 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, has suggested that credit event determinations by a “Determination Committee” (DC) could lead to an automatic triggering of a payment
without notification.120 A smart contract CDS would also need to integrate code-making references to the DC as a “third party oracle.”121
ISDA also suggests that “Definitions Booklets” would need
to be amended so that they “lend themselves to the application
See id. at 19–21.
Id. at 21.
117 Id. at 19.
118 Breana Patel, Blockchain in Capital Markets, FINEXTRA (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/15096/blockchain-in-capital-markets [https://
perma.cc/3ZGU-8L2C].
119 See The ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Comms., ISDA (MAY
2012), https://www.isda.org/a/CHDDE/agm-2012-dc-anniversary-appendix-0430
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2DD-ZKBW].
120 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 18.
121 Id.; see also Surujnath, supra note 57, at 274:
Oracles use multi-sig to incorporate outside information into the
blockchain. An oracle serves as an additional signatory that
attests to information that is not tracked by the blockchain. It
can reference an agreed upon data source and serve as an additional signature to a transaction that is contingent on a realworld event. Once the required condition is met, the oracle
signs the transaction with its private key to effectuate the transaction. In a trading system that relies on numerous ledgers to
keep track of different assets, the oracle can facilitate a payment
that is contingent on a factor tracked by another blockchain.
115
116
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of conditional logic.”122 Also, a smart contract MA would need to
be appropriately coded so that they are linked to bank accounts
to meet initial and variation margin.123
Given the significant impediments to full operational implementation (as will be presented shortly), ISDA has articulated
two potential models of smart contract integration.124 The first is
an “external model” which would preserve the current MA structure
but use Blockchain embedded smart contract code to automate some
aspects of the contract so that they happen automatically upon condition satisfaction.125 In this model, the actual contract would “take
precedence” (in the event of contradictions) over the code, which
would effectively just serve as a mechanism for more efficient performance and the parties would need to sign off on the code preexecution to ensure suitability.126 ISDA has noted that this is really
only a partial adaptation from what’s already used (for example
“daily collateral flows” are currently automated in the context of
maintaining margin requirements.)127
A second model identified by ISDA is an “internal model”
resembling a hybrid contract with either a written contract using “natural human language” for some clauses while describing
others in computer code, or a written contract making reference to
code in another place.128 In this model, the code is actually “part” of
the written contract.129 To this end, ISDA has suggested a number
of possibilities: either create a new programming language (which
lawyers would need to learn) or use an existing language that’s for
smart contracts130 (like Ethereum’s Solidity).131 The thought of lawyers being responsible for code that is legally binding could trigger
ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 20.
See Kari S. Larsen, Brett Hillis & Michael Selig, Suitability Of Swaps Documentation To The Blockchain Considered By ISDA, MONDAQ (Aug. 16, 2017),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/620418/Commodities+Derivatives+Stock
+Exchanges/Suitability+of+Swaps+Documentation+to+the+Blockchain+Consid
ered+by+ISDA#_ftn5 [https://perma.cc/Z7JG-6SJZ].
124 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 14–17.
125 Id. at 14.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 16.
130 See id. at 15.
131 Solidity is a “contract-oriented” programming language used for creating
smart contracts. See The Greeter, ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org/greeter
[https://perma.cc/8JGX-TLHR].
122
123
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a collective shudder throughout the derivatives transactional bar,
thus ISDA suggests an “industry standard” code would likely need
to be produced.132 ISDA notes however that a singular coding language may not be “interoperable” across a variety of Blockchains.133
F. Legal Recognition, Electronic Execution, and Jurisdictional
Enforceability Issues
In the next two subsections, the Article will outline some
of the problems with fully implementing an ISDA MA with a smart
contract. First, there is some uncertainty on the legal enforceability
of smart contracts altogether;134 although several states including
Arizona,135 Delaware,136 Vermont,137 Nevada,138 New Hampshire,139 Hawaii,140 and Illinois141 have initiated smart contract
ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 17.
Id. at 15.
134 See generally Craig A. de Ridder, Mercedes K. Tunstall & Nathalie Prescott,
Recognition of Smart Contracts in the United States, 29 No. 11 INTELL. PROP.
& TECH. L.J. 17, 17 (2017).
135 See H.R. 2417, 53rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017); see also de Ridder,
Tunstall & Prescott, supra note 134, at 17:
More recently, Arizona introduced the so-called “Smart Contract
Bill” in early February, and it quickly landed on the governor’s
desk for signature on March 29. Arizona’s new statute does more
than recognize the legality of smart contracts—it also brings any
signature, record, or contract that is “secured through blockchain technology” within the ambit of the state’s Electronic Transactions Act. Other jurisdictions could recognize smart contracts
under existing state laws modeled on the Uniform Electronic
Transaction Act or the federal Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act, without having to pass smart
contract, or blockchain technology, specific legislation.
136 See Joshua Ashley Klayman, Geoffrey R. Peck & Mark S. Wojciechowski,
Why The Delaware Blockchain Initiative Matters To All Dealmakers, FORBES
(Sept. 20, 2017, 9:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2017/09/20/why
-the-delaware-blockchain-initiative-matters-to-all-dealmakers/#45d6529c7550
[https://perma.cc/K9VG-CKUD]; see also Michael del Castillo, Delaware House
Passes Historic Blockchain Regulation, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/Dela
ware-house-passes-historic-blockchain-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/FV2G-3NXY].
137 See Stan Higgins, Vermont Could Collect Taxes in Crypto Under Proposed
Law, COINDESK (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/vermont-collect-taxes
-crypto-proposed-law/ [https://perma.cc/LJ6E-X7YY].
138 See H.R. 398, 79th Leg. (Nev. 2017).
139 See H.R. 436, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2017).
140 See H.R. 1481, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2017).
141 See H.R. 120, 100th General Assem. (Ill. 2017–2018).
132
133
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recognition legislation, or state-driven Blockchain initiatives to provide greater support for their legal validity.142 Further, significant
business projects are currently underway using smart contracts
including the Brooklyn Microgrid solar energy project, the California “Share & Charge” electronic vehicle platform, a multibank
“syndicated loan servicing program,” and Nasdaq’s New York
Interactive Advertising Exchange.143 Next, there is some jurisdictional uncertainty for electronic execution and on this point
ISDA has commissioned “e-contract opinions” from a number of
locations to determine viability.144
Also, ISDA has noted that there is some uncertainty, when
using Blockchain across international borders with respect to the
“situs” or location of assets.145
G. Partial or Full Integration: Transaction Costs and Strategic
Considerations
Smart contracts may, as technology writer Robin Moody
describes, reduce the cost of “managing mass repapering and renegotiations,” and also provide “data extraction” efficiencies;146
however, there are many aspects of smart contracts that make full
OTC CDS integration questionable.147 The previous section introduced several legal uncertainties in relation to enforceability
and jurisdiction.148 This Section will build on those concerns and
focus on specific practical and strategic challenges related to the
contract operation itself. First, as noted by lawyer Gernot Fritz,
See de Ridder, Tunstall & Prescott, supra note 134, at 17 (“Other jurisdictions could recognize smart contracts under existing state laws modeled on
the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act or the federal Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act, without having to pass smart contract, or
blockchain technology, specific legislation.”).
143 Id. at 18–19.
144 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 21.
145 Id. at 9.
146 Robin Moody, Derivatives Document Management—How Do Smart Contracts Fit In?, DERIVSOURCE (Sept. 20, 2016), https://derivsource.com/2016/09/20
/derivatives-document-management-how-do-smart-contracts-fit-in-2/ [https://
perma.cc/W77E-9ZBG].
147 See Gernot Fritz, What’s in a smart contract, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS
DERINGER BLOG, https://www.freshfields.com/en-us/our-thinking/campaigns/digi
tal/fintech/whats-in/whats-in-a-smart-contract/ [https://perma.cc/G3DY-C347].
148 See de Ridder, Tunstall & Prescott, supra note 134, at 17–18; see also
ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 20.
142

2019]

SMART CONTRACT BLOCKCHAIN

391

smart contracts are final and cannot be undone, modified or revised (the Blockchain prevents this), so void, or mistaken contracts
require additional programming, and remain on the Blockchain—
this creates an additional risk, and potential transaction cost.149
Next, as pointed out by Ryan Surujnath in a recent Fordham
Journal of Corporate and Financial Law article, a single party,
even with the consent of the other counterparty, cannot “edit” a
Blockchain to “reverse a transaction” or to satisfy a judicial order.150
To avoid such a situation, ISDA suggests that CDS counterparties consider all contingencies up front,151 but they also acknowledge this may be unrealistic and the cost of such activity could
easily outweigh the potential benefits.152
Next, even if one could identify all potential contingencies,
ISDA points out that some contractual provisions are “subjective
or require interpretation”153 and that provisions requiring “good
faith” or “commercially reasonable” interpretations can have different meanings in different jurisdictions.154 ISDA further notes that a
self-executing smart contract could lead to automatic performance
that is unauthorized by law,155 and automation may not be wanted
at all—for example in the 2002 ISDA MA, on an “Event of Default,”156 the non-defaulting party has a right of termination157 but
they may not want to automatically terminate the agreement if it is
in their economic best interest to keep it open (or some other factor
warrants keeping the contract alive),158 and the determination of
Fritz, supra note 147.
Surujnath, supra note 57, at 284, 295.
151 See generally ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 13.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 3.
154 Id. at 11.
155 Id.
156 See § 5(a) of the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement.
157 See id. § 6(a).
158 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 17–18:
The reasons for that decision tend to be subjective, depending
on the commercial and relationship context at the time of the
event, the nature of the default, and other external factors (e.g.,
proceedings that may occur under applicable law because of
the default). This would not seem to be susceptible to preprogramming. That does not mean a legal contract cannot have
elements of it ‘made smart’. It simply means these events would
not be automatically triggered (although they could lead to automatic alerts, which would be useful).
149
150
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which course to take is best made at the time of default, after
careful consideration of the context.159
An example of strategic self-selection against automation
can be found in Section 2(a)(iii)(1) of the 2002 ISDA MA, which provides that payments or delivery obligations of parties are subject
to a “condition precedent” that there are no “Events of Default” or
“Potential Events of Default.”160 In an MA negotiating strategy industry article, lawyer GuyLaine Charles suggests that in an “Event
of Default” a non-defaulting party may want to keep trades open
(for instance if a party is “net out of the money on all trades”)
but stop making payments or deliveries to the defaulting party (in
reliance on Section 2(a)(iii)(1)) and at the same time force the defaulting party to continue making payments to them.161 She adds
this strategy can have a significantly negative impact on a defaulting party, and the non-defaulting party’s choice of pursuing
this route is contextual on economic factors of the trade at the
time, and there might be multiple avenues of pursuit for a nondefaulting party in relation to the valuation of an early termination
See id.
See § 2(a)(iii)(1) of the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement; see also GuyLaine
Charles, The ISDA Master Agreement—Part II: Negotiated Provisions, PRACTICAL
COMPLIANCE & RISK MANAGEMENT FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY (May–June
2012) at 40:
The non-defaulting party may choose not to terminate its trades
under the ISDA, perhaps because it is net out of the money on
all trades, and yet may cease performing in reliance on these
provisions. In the meantime, the defaulting party is still required
to make timely payments, deliveries and margin transfers to
the non-defaulting party. Section 2(a)(iii)(1) allows the nondefaulting party to game the market by refusing to terminate
its transactions under the Agreement until it is beneficial to
do so, or when the market swings in its favour.
161 Charles, supra note 160, at 40:
The non-defaulting party may choose not to terminate its trades
under the ISDA, perhaps because it is net out of the money on
all trades, and yet may cease performing in reliance on these
provisions. In the meantime, the defaulting party is still required
to make timely payments, deliveries and margin transfers to
the non-defaulting party. Section 2(a)(iii)(1) allows the nondefaulting party to game the market by refusing to terminate
its transactions under the Agreement until it is beneficial to
do so, or when the market swings in its favour.
159
160
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payment.162 For example, in the 2002 ISDA MA when there is an
“Event of Default”163 or a “Termination Event,”164 the nondefaulting party (called a “Determining Party”) has the flexibility to
determine a “Close-Out Amount”165 and in determining this amount
may consider third party quotations, market data, and internally
derived sources.166 ISDA has opined that the “Close Out Amount”
choice was provided to Determining Parties to give them flexibility167 to use contextual factors to determine the best means of
calculating the Close Out Amount.168 Preprogramming arguably
removes this benefit.169
Another argument against full smart contract integration
identified by ISDA is that “operational clauses” in the MA (like
contingent payments, “options exercise” clauses, settlement set-offs,
and asset transfer clauses)170 are more easily drafted as “conditional logic” expressible through machine-automation171—while
“non-operational” clauses (like governing law,172 jurisdiction,173
integration,174 enforceability, or other representations)175 are not
as easily translated into computer expression.176 Also, ISDA points
out that what the parties agree on must align with what the code
See id.:
Excess collateral and settlement payments owed to the defaulting
party may be withheld by the non-defaulting party, thereby creating or further deepening the defaulting party’s credit problems.
This lack of liquidity may cause the defaulting party to default on
its obligations with other trading counterparties, triggering a
wave of defaults that leads to the defaulting party’s demise.
163 See § 5(a) of the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement.
164 See id. § 5(b).
165 See id. § 2(c).
166 See Charles, supra note 160, at 33–35.
167 See ISDA Close-Out Amount Protocol, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 27, 2009), https://
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bfb7f4c4-ab5b-4b30-933f-730cfee24b91
[https://perma.cc/3RWT-LWCX].
168 See id.
169 See Charles, supra note 160, at 33–34.
170 See § 6.1 ISDA 2006 Definitions; see also §§ 8.1, 8.2, 8.4, 8.5 ISDA 2002
Equity Derivative Definitions.
171 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 11.
172 See § 13(a) ISDA 2002 Master Agreement.
173 See id. § 13(b).
174 See id. § 9(a).
175 See id. § 3(a)(v).
176 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 11–12.
162
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actually says and what happens when it is automated.177 As a result, lawyers would need to either develop computer-programming
acumen, or involve technologists (thus increasing costs and opening
up lawyer-client confidentiality concerns).178 ISDA also questions
whether one “coding language” is sufficient for smart contracts (or
whether multiple are required).179 Given these criticisms, some
commentators question whether permissioned Blockchain may
provide little “beyond a traditional database or a basic messaging
service” and may be just another “walled off network.”180 Also, it is
possible that a status quo bias could motivate a slow integration
process.181 As a result, at least in the short run, ISDA and Linklaters recommends “automating” certain tasks in the MA (via smart
contract code) rather than replacing the MA all together.182
II. HOW WOULD PERMISSIONED BLOCKCHAIN IMPACT CDS
POST-TRADE FUNCTIONALITY, PROCESSING, AND
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE?
A. Inefficiencies in the Current CDS Post-Trade Processing
Framework & Potential Efficiency Gains From Blockchain
In a press release for a 2016 whitepaper183 on “Embracing
Disruption,” DTCC stated that Blockchain could “modernize,
streamline and simplify the siloed design of the financial industry infrastructure and address certain limitations of the current
post trade process”184 and that Blockchain is the “virtual opposite”
of the traditional processing structure.185 DTCC has identified
See id. at 17 (“The second potential area of difference is illustrated by the
question: ‘how do I know the effect of the code, when executed by a machine, will
be what I intend?’”).
178 See generally Fritz, supra note 147.
179 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 15.
180 See Nordrum, supra note 32.
181 See Moody, supra note 146.
182 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 3.
183 See generally DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14.
184 See New DTCC White Paper Calls for Leveraging Distributed Ledger Technology to Solve Certain Long-Standing Operational Challenges, DEPOSITORY
TRUST & CLEARING CORP. (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.dtcc.com/news/2016/Janu
ary/25/new-dtcc-white-paper-calls-for-leveraging-distributed-ledger-technology
[https://perma.cc/NSY2-L3WJ].
185 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 1.
177
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Blockchain as potentially useful for issuing and servicing assets
and securities, managing data, validating trades and contracts, netting, clearing, and settlement,186 and that Blockchain could also
potentially remedy four financial processing weaknesses: “siloed”
systems with human error discrepancies; unneeded complexity; susceptibility to hacks; and no “24/7/365 processing” abilities.187 DTCC
also notes that Blockchain may reduce “manual interactions, data
exchanges, data format conversions and reconciliations with other
systems.”188 DTCC identifies however several areas where Blockchain frameworks fall short, including database functionality (like
in high-speed searching, retrieval, and reporting functions)189 as
well as requiring costly computing and storage capacity.190
Under the current processing framework for CDS, there is
potential for human error when, as technology reporter Laura Shin
notes, information gets “entered into multiple databases in different
ways.”191 For example, a trade may be recorded initially then altered when processed by operations (and further edited by risk
management and again by the credit department).192 ISDA in a
September 2017 whitepaper on Data and Process Standards,193 has
identified several “stakeholders” who might benefit by adopting a
Blockchain processing framework including “market participants,”
regulators, “market infrastructure providers,” and “fintech and solution providers.”194 In a separate whitepaper on “The Future of Derivative Processing and Market Infrastructure,” ISDA also suggests
that for market participants, operating expenses and inefficiencies
could be decreased through a “Golden Record” processing model
with a “single representation of a transaction.”195 This singular
See id. at 2.
See id. at 5.
188 See id. at 12.
189 See id. at 8.
190 See id. at 9.
191 See Laura Shin, DTCC Partners With IBM, Startups For Blockchain-Based
Credit Default Swaps Solution, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/01/09/dtcc-selects-partners-for-blockchain-so
lution-for-credit-default-swaps/#c56f49750619.
192 See id.
193 See WHITE PAPER: DATA & PROCESS STANDARDS, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N CDM (Sept. 2017) [hereinafter ISDA DATA PROCESS].
194 See id. at 10.
195 See ISDA FUTURE PROCESSING, supra note 29, at 23:
If structured correctly, this Golden Record may remove the need
for many of the duplicative reconciliation processes that exist
186
187
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record may also lead to “optimized” collateral and netting procedures and regulatory compliance efficiencies,196 and provide
regulators with better technological tools to monitor and manage
systemic risk.197 Additionally, ISDA, in two other whitepapers,
suggests that “market infrastructure providers” and “fintech and
solution providers” could add greater benefits through coordinated
action,198 and the digital “modularisation” of documentation terms
in a “universal repository” could also be used to enhance individual
transactions.199 This would allow the ISDA library to be continually updated instead of the “periodic updates of definitional
booklets” that currently happens.200
B. Regulatory Standards: Business Conduct, Reporting, and
Record-Keeping
Blockchain integration potentially impacts Swap Dealer’s
and Security-Based Swap Dealers (collectively “SDs”)201 and Major
Swap Participant’s and Major Security-Based Swap Participants
(collectively “MSPs”)202 business conduct, reporting, and recordkeeping obligations pursuant to Title VII of the DFA.203 Pursuant to
business conduct standards, SDs and MSPs must comply with
“fair dealing and trade disclosures, written trading documentation and swap confirmations that contain all applicable terms of
a swap transaction, and portfolio reconciliation to confirm that
the terms of their swaps match the terms in the records of their
today, such as reconciliation for settlement, compression and margining purposes. More importantly, it will assist market participants and regulators to access an accurate and up-to-date
instance of a transaction at any time, potentially removing or
reducing some of the current burdens of regulatory reporting.
196 See id. at 23, 25.
197 See id. at 25.
198 See ISDA DATA PROCESS, supra note 193, at 10.
199 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 22.
200 See id. at 22.
201 See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49)(A) (2012), Commodity Exchange Act § 1a(49)(A);
see also Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap Participant,” “Major Security Based-Swap Participant,” and “Eligible
Contract Participant,” 77 Fed. Reg. 30, 751–53 (May 23, 2012).
202 See Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security Based Swap Dealer,”
“Major Swap Participant,” “Major Security Based-Swap Participant,” and “Eligible
Contract Participant,” 77 Fed. Reg. 30, 751–53 (May 23, 2012).
203 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 729, 766 (2012).
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counter parties.”204 The use of a permissioned Blockchain may
ease these counterparty verification and disclosure burdens and
potentially reduce the costs of “portfolio reconciliation,”205 thus
minimizing potential disputes. Forbes technology reporter Laura
Shin suggests that in this regard, Blockchain may facilitate a more
efficient ledger, ensuring information consistency and avoiding
“fragmented processing” that facilitates errors and risk.206
Post GFC reform ushered in a host of reporting obligations
for both cleared and non-cleared swap trades.207 In particular, Section 731 of the DFA208 includes heightened reporting, recordkeeping and daily trading records requirements and registration.209
Specifically SDs and MSPs must “make such reports as are
required by the Commission by rule or regulation regarding the
transactions and positions and financial condition of the registered swap dealer or major swap participant,”210 adhere to prescribed bookkeeping requirements,211 and allow open access to
the regulators.212 SDs and MSPs are also required to keep daily
See BARR, JACKSON & TAHYAR, supra note 109, at 1112.
See id. at 1113:
Portfolio reconciliation is a post-trade execution process and a
risk management tool that is designed to (1) identify and resolve
any discrepancies between the records of the counterparties regarding the terms of a swap and the valuation of the swap; and
(2) ensure effective confirmation of all terms of the swap. The
frequency with which parties must engage in portfolio reconciliation ranges from daily to annually and depends on the number of
swaps in the counter parties’ portfolio and the parties involved
(whether one party is an end user).
206 See Shin, supra note 191.
207 See generally 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)(13)(G), 6r (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(m)(1)(G),
78m-1 (2012).
208 See 7 U.S.C. § 6s.
209 See id. at §§ 6s(f), 6s(g).
210 See id. at § 6s.
211 See generally M. Holland West & Matthew K. Kerfoot, The Impact of DoddFrank on Derivatives, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 269, 289–300 (2013).
212 See 7 U.S.C. § 6s(f)(1)(B)–(D):
(B)(i) for which there is a prudential regulator, shall keep books
and records of all activities related to the business as a swap
dealer or major swap participant in such form and manner and
for such period as may be prescribed by the Commission by rule or
regulation; and (ii) for which there is no prudential regulator,
shall keep books and records in such form and manner and for
204
205
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trading records,213 counterparty records,214 and an audit trail.215
Colleen Baker, of the Volcker Alliance, notes that, as a result of the
reforms, “all swaps and security-based swaps—whether cleared
or not—must be reported to swap data repositories.”216 Having
all trading and counterparty information readily available on a
Blockchain, and providing the regulators access to the ledger can
reduce the cost of compliance with these reporting provisions and
provide reporting on an “intraday” basis describes technology writer
Breana Patel.217 Time delays, however, would need to be programmed into the Blockchain code for large “block trades” to
adhere to market regulations and the permissioned Blockchain
would need to be adjusted to maintain confidentiality in relation
to market positions and counterparty identity.218
such period as may be prescribed by the Commission by rule
or regulation; (C) shall keep books and records described in subparagraph (B) open to inspection and examination by any representative of the Commission; and (D) shall keep any such books
and records relating to swaps defined in section 1a(47)(A)(v) of
this title open to inspection and examination by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
See id. at § 6s(f)(1)(A).
213 See 7 U.S.C. § 6s(f)(1)(B)–(D):
(B)(i) for which there is a prudential regulator, shall keep books
and records of all activities related to the business as a swap
dealer or major swap participant in such form and manner
and for such period as may be prescribed by the Commission
by rule or regulation; and (ii) for which there is no prudential
regulator, shall keep books and records in such form and manner and for such period as may be prescribed by the Commission
by rule or regulation; (C) shall keep books and records described
in subparagraph (B) open to inspection and examination by any
representative of the Commission; and (D) shall keep any such
books and records relating to swaps defined in section 1a(47)(A)(v)
of this title open to inspection and examination by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
214 See § 6s.
215 See id. at §§ 6s(f), 6s(g).
216 See Colleen Baker, Clearinghouses for Over-the-Counter Derivatives 15
(Volcker Alliance, Working Paper, 2016).
217 Patel, supra note 118.
218 See West et al., CFTC Issues Guidance on Block Trade and Large Notional Off-Facility Swap Rules; Advisors Must Obtain Consent, DECHERT LLP
(Sept. 2013).
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C. Central Clearing, Netting, Collateral Management and
Settlement
A major tenant of post-GFC derivatives reform was adopting clearing by central counterparties (“CCPs”) for a variety of previously OTC CDS.219 Colleen Baker describes this process as a CCP
stepping “into the middle of an OTC derivative trade and creat[ing]
two new transactions through a legal process known as novation.”220 This results in original counterparties being only subject to
the credit risk of the CCP (rather than to each other)221 and this
market mechanism is believed to be better than dealer banks in
managing and absorbing counterparty credit risk,222 and also an
effective means of reducing the transaction costs involved in netting.223 CCPs have been criticized heavily across a variety of
academic studies as centralizing the “locus of systemic risk” in swap
transactions;224 increasing systemic risk in the context of bankruptcy;225 facilitating “fragmented netting;”226 causing “destructive
coordination” by segmenting assets;227 underpricing risk because
Central clearing is mandatory for “index-based” credit default swaps.
See Hester Peirce, Derivatives Clearinghouses: Clearing The Way To Failure,
64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 589, 590 (2016).
220 Baker, supra note 216, at 17.
221 Id. at 18.
222 See Adam J. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case For Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 461 (2013). See generally Baker, supra note 216.
223 See Baker, supra note 216, at 25.
224 Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure
For Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 1153 (2012).
225 See Julia Lees Allen, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A
Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1093 (2016).
226 Sean J. Griffith, The Derivatives Clearinghouse: Designing A Governance
Structure To Manage Systemic Risk, 32 No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL’Y
REP. 1, 15–16 (Apr. 2013):
The rise of multiple clearinghouses means fragmented netting. In
a world of fragmented netting, the only trades available to a
clearinghouse to offset losses from a dealer’s default are positions cleared by that particular clearinghouse, a subset of all open
positions with the defaulting dealer. Fewer open positions, of
course, means greater residual loss for the clearinghouse to absorb, a problem that will be repeated for each clearinghouse in
which the defaulting member participates.
See also Baker, supra note 216, at 35.
227 Griffith, supra note 226, at 16 (“Because ... clearinghouses specialize in
specific asset classes—for example, foreign exchange, interest rate swaps, or
credit default swaps (CDS)—they are likely to be susceptible to asset bubbles
219
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of “adverse selection”228 (and thereby increasing moral hazard);229
and perpetuating “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions.230 As a
result, CCPs may not eliminate risk, but as Colleen Baker states
merely “transform” it.231 Netting and collateralization (including
margin requirements) are important ways that CCPs manage default risk.232 DTCC has identified Blockchain as potentially allowing an “optimized settlement” when considering the netting,233
clearing,234 and processing235 of CDS transactions to create “value
transfer, in near real time, independent of a trusted third party.”236
However DTCC also notes that this comes with significant costs
and a potential for “bifurcated markets with proprietary settlement and asset management mechanisms.”237 As such, DTCC suggests the opportunity may be more suitable for emerging markets238
which leads to some commentators doubting whether Blockchain
will actually supplant CCPs.239 Given that there is still a large portion of the CDS market that is not cleared,240 Ryan Surujnath, in
in the underlying asset. This is a case of ‘destructive coordination’ brought on
by regulation.”).
228 Baker, supra note 216, at 26.
229 See Levitin, supra note 222, at 463–64; see also id. at 27.
230 Levitin, supra note 222, at 447.
231 See Baker, supra note 216, at 5.
232 See Surujnath, supra note 57, at 279.
233 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 15 (“Netting is defined as an
optimized settlement requirement between all parties involved in trading an
asset.”); see also Baker, supra note 216, at 24 (“With multilateral netting, a
clearinghouse can offset the payment obligations of multiple counterparties (its
clearing members) so that only counterparties’ net payment obligations—typically
a much smaller amount than their gross obligations—need to be exchanged with
the clearinghouse.”).
234 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 15 (“Clearing is using a central counter party for each trade to simplify multiparty netting and reduce risk
of settlement failure.”).
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 16.
238 Id.
239 See Surujnath, supra note 57, at 281–82.
240 See Baker, supra note 216, at 33:
At the end of 2014, about half of all interest rate swaps and a
fifth of credit default swaps were cleared. The percentages are
much higher for new transactions: about 80 [percent] of new
interest rate swaps are cleared and 70 [percent] of new credit
default swaps based on credit indices are cleared.
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a recent Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law article suggests that Blockchain may impact the non-cleared OTC
market since it “can assume functions typically undertaken” by
CCPs and allow users to organize into “distributed autonomous
organizations” (a function also facilitated by Ethereum).241
In a Blockchain CDS, collateral calls could be written
through smart contract code to directly debit bank accounts as the
market changes242 and in this case technology writer Breana Patel
frames Blockchain as an “enterprise-wide management” of client
and firm credit risk.243 ISDA has established the ISDA Collateral
Infrastructure Committee (“CIC”)244 to develop a blueprint for an
“optimal future state” of collateral processing that takes into
consideration scalability, central storage, “interoperability,” and
automation.245 To this end, certain “observed pain points” identified by ISDA in the current OTC trading system include costs of
repetition, a lack of standardization and scalability, delays, and
problems in resolving disputes.246 Another challenge noted by
ISDA, which may benefit from Blockchain is “mismatched trades”
and margin disputes.247 On this point the smart contracts could
See also Arshadur Rahman, Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, central clearing and financial stability, BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. Q3 (2015).
241 Surujnath, supra note 57, at 283:
Firms trading these derivatives could use a blockchain like
Ethereum, which allows users to organize into distributed autonomous organizations (“DAO”) governed by smart contracts. Once
the criteria for admission into the DCN are met, the blockchain
manages the functions usually conducted by the CCP: valuing
contracts, calculating initial and variation margins, facilitating
custody of collateral, handling novation and netting, and managing closeout. Derivatives are contracts that have calculable
terms with an “algorithm” expressed through legal terms. Valuations typically present a problem in bilateral markets because
the two parties compute the algorithms themselves and may
reach different conclusions on pricing. Blockchains crowdsource
the calculations and allow the network to reach a consensus
on their accuracy. Proponents hope that the communal process can result in more transparent OTC markets.
242 See Patel, supra note 118.
243 Id.
244 See A Blueprint for the Optimal Future State of Collateral Processing,
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N (Oct. 2017).
245 Id. at 4.
246 Id. at 5–6.
247 Id. at 8.
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make reference to an agreed upon benchmarks to adjust margin
requirements as asset values change.248
With respect to settlement,249 DTCC has stated that many
complex swaps can take many weeks (or months) to settle.250 Blockchain might decrease this time frame; however, as DTCC points
out, “real time settlement” can actually be achieved right now251
and changes to settlement conventions require, “revising laws,
changing market practices and structures” and as such imply a
level of coordination difficulty.252 DTCC also argues that the logic of
settlement applies to collateral management since “[t]he provenance of assets, the ability to track transaction movements and,
with proper design, true ownership vs. temporary/borrowing is
fundamental to the promise of distributed ledger technology.”253
D. Trade Validation, Recording, Matching, and Position Limit
Management
Breana Patel suggests that Blockchain may facilitate “matching of trades during the settlement process” to avoid errors during
settlement.254 In a CDS, participating parties use a “matching
service” to ensure aligning terms which translate into a final agreement and Blockchain might be able to reduce “costly trade and
payment reconciliations” associated with this process.255 DTCC has
expressed concern however with using Blockchain for trade validation, recording and matching because of the issues relating to
See generally Surujnath, supra note 57, at 280–81.
See generally Norman Menachem Feder, Market in the Remaking: Over
the Counter Derivative in a New Age, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 309, 326 (2017).
250 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 16.
251 Id. at 16–17.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Patel, supra note 118:
Confirm matching of trades during the settlement process can
be done via smart contracts. If a European bank has transacted
a swap contract with a U.S. bank, the settlement details would
only be provided if the financial details of the trade match between the two banks. The smart contract allows automatic payment processing, only if certain parameters within the agreed
upon contract are satisfied. As a result of smart contracts, costly
errors from the manual processing of settlement instructions
can be reduced dramatically.
255 See Nordrum, supra note 32.
248
249
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finality and singular ledger data entry since it does not contemplate
“real world mismatches and exception processing.”256 Further,
DTCC suggests that a Blockchain based framework might lead
to a system based on “regional rules” leading to a “partitioned
scheme.”257 A Blockchain framework could however help to prevent a large unknown trading loss, like JP Morgan Chase’s 2012
“London Whale”258 through the programming of position limits.259
In addition, “suspicious trading activity” could be identified early
on a Blockchain to prevent regulatory penalties or financial losses.260
E. Regulatory Considerations and Developments Relating to
Blockchain Derivatives
ISDA has identified regulatory benefits using Blockchain
since “[t]ransaction data could be held on a permissioned, private
distributed ledger that would be available to regulators. This would
ensure there is a single, shared representation of each trade.”261
Regulators would however need to adopt consistent standards for the industry.262 On November 30, 2017, at ISDA’s Technology and Standards: Unlocking Value in Derivatives Markets
conference, CFTC Commissioner, Brian Quintenz articulated
both the promise and the challenges (such as market participant
adoption and overcoming implementation costs) in integrating
Blockchain in derivatives markets.263 To support innovation, the
CFTC recently launched Lab CFTC—designed to provide timely
regulatory feedback to innovators, study, test and recommend new
products and technologies, and coordinate oversight efforts with
other domestic and international regulatory bodies.264 The CFTC
DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 14.
Id.
258 The “London Whale” scandal relates to a 2012 CDS trading losses of at
least $6.2 billion by JPMorgan Chase & Co. that caught senior management
unaware. See Patricia Hurtado, The London Whale, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/the-london-whale.
259 Patel, supra note 118.
260 Id.
261 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 3.
262 Id.
263 See Brian D. Quintenz, Keynote Speech at the ISDA TECH CONFERENCE
(Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.pscp.tv/ISDA1/1mnxerjNgvnKX?t=58s/.
264 See id.; see also Lab CFTC Overview, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/LabCFTC/Overview/index.htm [https://perma
.cc/4DLN-XEYW].
256
257
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also recently signed a collaboration agreement with the UK’s
Financial Conduct Authority to study financial technology.265
There are lingering uncertainties including the effect of
deregulation,266 the reporting and execution framework for cross
border trades,267 regulatory arbitrage,268 and whether industry
should own the Blockchain technology.269 Also the data made available to the regulators pursuant to the DFA requires technology
to interpret and proactively monitor.270
ISDA notes that an industry-wide Blockchain framework
could remedy this problem, but regulators would need to improve
assessment technologies.271 Also, regulators need “modified permissions or an identification system to de-anonymize” the transaction
parties.272 Another regulatory uncertainty noted by Ryan Surujnath
is the effect of Blockchain on systemic risk,273 which could reduce the “risk of over-centralization.”274
However, as Surujnath has argued, Blockchain derivatives
could actually increase systemic risk relating to uncertainties in
“settlement finality and recourse, especially in the context of
See US CFTC and UK FCA Sign Agreement to Collaborate on FinTech
Innovation, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Feb. 20, 2018), http://
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7698-18 [https://perma.cc/757W-W7BS].
266 See Protecting Financial Stability and Enhancing Competitiveness in the
Derivatives Market: Hearing on “Legislative Proposals Regarding Derivatives”
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Sec. & Inv.,
116th Cong. 9, 16 (Feb. 14, 2018) [hereinafter Protecting Financial Stability and
Enhancing Competitiveness in the Derivatives Market] (testimony of Andy Green,
Managing Director, Economic Policy, Center for American Progress).
267 See Acker, supra note 106, at 950.
268 See Benjamin M. Weadon, International Regulatory Arbitrage Resulting
From Dodd-Frank Derivatives Regulation, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 249, 251 (2012).
269 See ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 9.
270 See Protecting Financial Stability and Enhancing Competitiveness in the
Derivatives Market, supra note 266.
271 See generally ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 3, 9; Hearing
on Implementation and Cybersecurity Protocols of the Consolidated Audit Trail Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Sec., & Inv., 115th
Cong. (Nov. 30, 2017) (testimony of Tyler Gellasch, Executive Director of the
Healthy Markets Association), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles
/hhrg-115-ba16-wstate-tgellasch-20171130.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3PY-QPT3].
272 Surujnath, supra note 57, at 282.
273 See id. at 294–95.
274 Id. at 291.
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potential cyberattacks.”275 However, he notes that this concern
may be alleviated through a private ledger.276
F. Technological Barriers, Market Participant Adoption,
Integration Failure Costs, and Data Privacy Concerns
Despite the potential appeal of Blockchain, there are many
technological barriers to be overcome before widespread integration can take place. ISDA has identified the need for a “consistent,
non-ambiguous” coding language277 that is interoperable across
industry lines and diverse use cases.278 Also, as noted by DTCC,
there are “limits on the size of individual transactions and the
number of transactions that can be written simultaneously,” as
well as “latency between writes to the ledger and final confirmation.”279 Further, DTCC posits that existing infrastructure might
be improved without such high costs280 and the reality of hacks
on a distributed leger (like in the case of the DAO) drives lingering privacy and data protection concerns.281
Also, as suggested by CFTC Commissioner Quintenz, participants in the market must be willing to undertake the costs of
digitization of their entire processing infrastructure.282
This is a point that ISDA has identified and stressed in a
September 2017 whitepaper entitled Data and Process Standards,
“there is no commercial advantage to organi[z]ations developing
and maintaining standards separately. Current mechanisms for
information exchange and storage are not scalable and will potentially (i) inhibit innovation and (ii) increase operational risks and
See also id. at 295, 299 (“There is always the possibility that an actor or
several actors working in concert could assume most of the blockchain’s mining power, giving them the ability to rewrite blocks and undo previously settled transactions.”).
276 Id. at 299–300.
277 ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER, supra note 29, at 19.
278 Id. at 20.
279 DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 12.
280 See id.
281 See David Siegel, Understanding the DAO Attack, COINDESK, https://www
.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists [https://perma.cc/GE6D-TUAV].
282 See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, REMARKS OF COMMISSIONER BRIAN QUINTENZ AT THE TECHNOLOGY AND STANDARDS: UNLOCKING VALUE
IN DERIVATIVES MARKETS CONFERENCE (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.cftc.gov/Press
Room/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz4#P16_4000 [https://perma.cc/UN73-8V98].
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costs.”283 To this end, ISDA has recommended a “standardized
data and process definition hierarchy”284 and has noted that, despite the costs (and challenges), a Blockchain solution to derivatives does present “long-term scalable foundations.”285
DTCC has also identified several challenges to widespread
industry integration of Blockchain including cost justifications,
“inherent scale and performance challenges,” and industry and
regulatory coordination and consensus.286 Further, the costs of
error are high since the current system works.287 Additionally,
ISDA notes there is a possibility that multiple ledgers could arise
across markets and connecting these ledgers may prove difficult
and costly.288 DTCC also notes uncertainty on Blockchain’s immunity from cyber-attacks289 and on the size and number of individual transactions that can be written simultaneously.290
Another concern is data privacy, especially in light of different
global regulatory standards.291 One could contemplate a “partitioned ledger” solution, but this would need to be tested as viable.292
CONCLUSION: CURRENT CDS AND OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES
BLOCKCHAIN INITIATIVES
In the spring of 2017, the first publicly announced Blockchain derivatives initiative launched between DTCC, Blockchain
developer Axoni, financial services software provider R3, and technology giant IBM.293 DTCC’s mission is to provide “post-trade
ISDA DATA PROCESS, supra note 193, at 4.
Id.
285 Id. at 6.
286 DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 2.
287 See id. (“[T]he industry is at risk of repeating the past and creating countless new siloed solutions based on different standards and with significant
reconciliation challenges.”)
288 See ISDA FUTURE PROCESSING, supra note 29, at 23.
289 See DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14, at 12.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 9.
292 Id.
293 See Alex Lielacher, DTCC to Launch Blockchain Credit Default Swaps
Reporting in Early 2018, NASDAQ (May 25, 2017, 2:31 PM), http://www.nas
daq.com/article/dtcc-to-launch-blockchain-credit-default-swaps-reporting-in-early
-2018-cm794771 [https://perma.cc/469A-3AR6].
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market infrastructure” to the U.S. financial industry294 and the
joint venture project aims at creating a CDS clearing platform to
enhance its operations.295 The joint venture’s first phase is to use
Blockchain to improve DTCC’s Trade Information Warehouse,296
which is used in over 70 countries by more than 2500 firms to
manage records for “$11 trillion of credit derivatives.”297 An additional, more ambitious, subsequent phase would contemplate
providing ledger connection points to participating firms, thereby
“enabling them to validate reported data and directly access information.”298 Project partners estimate that the joint venture will
save between “20 to 30 percent” of the costs of running swaps
conventionally,299 and preliminary trials show positive results.300
Also, the initial assessments protected party confidentiality and
showed regulatory promise as “regulators could view in ‘real time’ a
wide range of financial events including trade details, counterparty
risk metrics, and exposure to reference entities.”301 Critics, however,
say that it is “still a proprietary system through which centralized players control trading behind walled-off networks.”302
In additional to swaps, there are other Blockchain derivatives projects currently contemplated. In February 2017, DTCC,
along with Blockchain developer Digital Assets, announced the
See DEPOSITORY TRUST AND CLEARING CORPORATION, http://www.dtcc
.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/About/DTCC_Capabilities.pdf [https://perma.cc
/F826-P54J].
295 See Lielacher, supra note 293.
296 See Trade Information Warehouse, DEPOSITORY TRUST CLEARING CORP.,
http://www.dtcc.com/derivatives-services/trade-information-warehouse, [https://
perma.cc/QG4T-X2UW].
297 Shin, supra note 191.
298 Helen Bartholomew, Derivatives—DTCC on track for Q1 2018 blockchain
CDS reporting, REUTERS (May 19, 2017, 7:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/derivatives-dtcc-on-track-for-q1-2018-bl/derivatives-dtcc-on-track-for-q1-2018
-blockchain-cds-reporting-idUSL8N1IJ5BF [https://perma.cc/UU9L-5PX9].
299 Nordrum, supra note 32.
300 See Anna Irrera, DTCC to rebuild credit default swaps processing platform
with blockchain, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2017, 8:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/us-blockchain-dtcc-cds/dtcc-to-rebuild-credit-default-swaps-processing-platform
-with-blockchain-idUSKBN14T1EA [https://perma.cc/C26B-GBXT].
301 Michael del Castillo, 7 Wall Street Firms Test Blockchain For Credit Default Swaps, COINDESK (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain
-credit-default-swaps-wall-street [https://perma.cc/X9CQ-SYJ9].
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desire to form a “Stakeholder Working Group” to study a Blockchain application for the repo-netting process.303 Unfortunately
this initiative was shelved in 2018 because “banks and other
potential users believed the same results could be achieved more
cheaply using current technology.”304 The repo-netting initiative
would have allowed DTCC to “calculate a new net settlement
amount at a point in time and record it in an immutable, secure
and transparent distributed ledger.”305 DTCC is however working with Digital Asset Holdings on a Blockchain framework for
syndicated loans,306 and also recently released a new study noting that distributed ledger technology “is capable of supporting
the average daily trading volumes in the U.S. equity market.”307
In the United Kingdom, interdealer broker ICAP has also completed Blockchain trials for securities “post-trade processes,”308
and private equity firm, Unigestion, recently adapted a “shadow
mode” Blockchain private investment fund.309 Also, the Bank of
Canada (Canada’s central bank) has partnered with TMX Group
and Payments Canada to investigate the application of Blockchain
to settlement and securities clearing,310 and recently announced

DTCC & Digital Asset Move to Next Phase After Successful Proof-OfConcept for Repo Transactions Using Distributed Ledger Technology, DEPOSITORY
TRUST & CLEARING CORP. (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.dtcc.com/news/2017/feb
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U.S. Equity Markets, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarah
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-markets/#323aea2036d0.
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Trial, COINDESK (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/icap-completes-post
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proof of concept for this project.311 Further, ING is working with
ABN Amro and Societe Generale on a Blockchain project for agricultural commodities;312 and Northern Trust has rolled out a Blockchain-based framework for private equity deals based out of
Guernsey, Channel Islands.313
It would be disingenuous to state that Blockchain will not
impact financial transactions in some way—even in mature
markets—and this will likely include derivatives contracting
and processing.314 The extent of its impact at this point is uncertain. As with other nascent technologies, the “promise” (or hope)
of an innovation’s potential impact can bring with it an unrealistic optimism about how fast change will come about, the costs
associated with creating this change, and the extent that we will
end up in a better situation (all things considered) than we currently have.315 As the Article has shown, applying Blockchain to
CDS, for both smart contract execution and post-trade processing
infrastructure, has problems and drawbacks.316 At a minimum—
given our current level of technology—the implementation costs
and questionable benefits should perhaps give us pause and cast
a little doubt on just how quickly (and to what extent) Blockchain
will actually change complex financial structures like derivatives
transactions.317 As such, it would seem that the rush to herald
Blockchain as inevitable for all commercial transactions is premature,318 and there is an emerging concern, identified recently
by Penny Crosman of the American Banker, that enthusiasm for
See The Bank of Canada, TMX Group, Accenture and R3 Demonstrate
Feasibility of Instantaneous Equity Settlement Through Distributed Ledger Technology, PAYMENTS CANADA (May 11, 2018), https://www.payments.ca/about
-us/news/payments-canada-bank-canada-tmx-group-accenture-and-r3-demon
strate-feasibility.
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AM. BANKER (Mar. 23, 2018, 2:12 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news
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314 See Shin, supra note 191.
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blockchain, HACKERNOON (Dec. 22, 2017), https://hackernoon.com/ten-years-in-no
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new Blockchain projects across financial applications in America is
“ebbing” by major institutions because of legal, regulatory and
security concerns, high implementation costs, “interoperability
issues”, and a lack of a clear “return on investment.”319
This Article has analyzed a derivatives product (CDS) that
seems, at the outset, to be ideal for Blockchain application, and
then assessed, using the studies produced by ISDA, the DTCC, and
other industry, technology, and legal commentaries and academic
papers, whether there is a case to be made for using Blockchain
to improve CDS execution and processing, while also facilitating
enhanced regulatory supervision, and reducing transactional,
operational and regulatory compliance costs.320 As noted, the
results are largely mixed and also point to many drawbacks. 321
There are benefits worth exploring (which would explain the
current projects discussed in this Part);322 however, there are
also significant costs and barriers to implementation, with drawbacks for smart contracts (which suggests a partial implementation is the only feasible application),323 and also concerns when
Blockchain is used for CDS post-trade processing.324
These drawbacks and concerns may explain why Blockchain has not yet transformed the derivatives world, despite the
technology being known for over a decade.325 Is it possible that,
as technology writer Kai Stinchcombe has argued, “[t]he entire
worldview underlying blockchain is wrong?”326 Time will ultimately
judge this question, although a more reasonable short-term explanation is simply that—like every other business decision—there
are costs and benefits to be explored, and right now the costs seem
to outweigh the benefits when using Blockchain for CDS. So what
we are left with is a “wait and see” proposition, as to whether, and
to what extent, technological improvements relating to Blockchain
Crosman, supra note 312.
See generally DTCC WHITEPAPER, supra note 14; ISDA 2017 WHITEPAPER,
supra note 29.
321 See, e.g., Stinchcombe, supra note 318.
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will reduce or overcome altogether these costs, and also whether
industry adoption will be homogenized enough to transcend the
fragmentation concerns previously identified. If this occurs then
we could see a larger CDS and derivatives market adoption of
Blockchain technology; however, if technological progress is static,
and adoption remains fragmented, then Blockchain implementation will be slow to materialize.

